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Spyware in a Cheap Android TV: Auditing the AQUA MatrixTV over ADB

Spyware in a Cheap Android TV: Auditing the AQUA MatrixTV over ADB

A relative bought an AQUA MatrixTV EE, Android 14, the kind of no-name box that undercuts the big brands by half. It works fine as a TV. It also shipped with an automatic content recognition package whose job is to listen to what is on screen and phone home about it, plus a stack of over-permissioned OEM apps. I pulled the APKs, read the DEX, and removed what should not be there. All of it over WiFi ADB, no root.

This is a companion to the Xiaomi Mi TV debloat: same method, different vendor, worse payload.

Finding the TV

The box sat at 192.168.1.168 with ADB on. First connection came back unauthorized, which is normal. I approved the prompt on screen and confirmed the identity:

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adb connect 192.168.1.168:5555
adb shell getprop ro.product.model     # AQUA_00
adb shell getprop ro.build.version.release   # 14
adb shell id                            # uid=2000(shell), no su

id matters. shell uid means no root, so nothing here needs a bootloader unlock. System apps can still be removed per-user with pm uninstall --user 0.

Triage before pulling anything

Two things decide what is safe to touch. First, who owns HOME:

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adb shell cmd package resolve-activity -a android.intent.action.MAIN -c android.intent.category.HOME

Second, what OEM packages actually exist:

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adb shell pm list packages | grep -iE "haier|cvte|anoki|cltv|usmart|telink|hon\.|gamingbar"

That gave the target list: the ACR package, two factory-test apps, a gaming overlay, an e-manual, a smart-home app, a “HON” service, a device-admin package, plus the BT remote stack (com.telink.lt) and the display backlight service, which stay because removing them breaks the remote and the screen.

The actual spyware: Anoki ACR

The package name is tv.anoki.acr.anokiacroptin. The acroutpt-in on the end is the giveaway that this is the “opt-in” build, except it is enabled by default and grants itself permissions the day it installs. It is a priv-app at /system/priv-app/AnokiACR/, uid 1000000 (SHARED_UID_SYSTEM).

What it does, from the DEX strings and manifest:

  • Microphone and audio fingerprinting. RECORD_AUDIO, CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT, android.permission.ACCESS_MIC, MediaProjection, AudioFingerprint, startScreenCapture.
  • Screen content. SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW and FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION let it overlay and capture what is displayed, including DRM-protected playback, since it is a platform-signed system uid.
  • Accessibility as a data tap. SpeechRecognitionService, AccessibilityService, and reads browser history and cookies through android.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARK.
  • Silent updates. REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES, INSTALL_PACKAGES, DELETE_PACKAGES.
  • Stealth channel. FOREGROUND_SERVICE_SPECIAL_USE, startForegroundService with no visible notification, its own Network VPN consent screen, and DoH (DnsOverHttpsApi) so lookups do not touch the LAN resolver.
  • Opt-out that is really opt-out. POST_NOTIFICATIONS, ACCESS_RESTRICTED_SETTINGS, MANAGE_APP_OPS_MODES.

The network side is worse. The package contains the literal class com.anoki.tvACR.ExportDataUAgent.binary.ACRGlobals$AIStrmMicKeywordDoH and targets aistrm.net plus acr-config.aistrm.net, with reportToGoogleApps endpoints (googlesyndication.com/pagead/..., googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/...). In plain terms: it sends captured-keyword and HA device-fingerprint data to Google Ads endpoints. An ACR package on a cheap TV, exfiltrating viewing and audio fingerprints to an ad network.

Two things make this different from ordinary bloat. It bypasses DoH, so a Pi-hole sinkhole at the router is not enough on its own. And it grants a foreground service type with no visible notification, so there is no “app is using your microphone” indicator.

Bloatware that is really spyware-shaped

The OEM apps are not clean either. Permission counts from dumpsys package, all granted=true:

PackagePerms grantedWhat it can reach
com.haier.gamingbar49READ_FRAMEBUFFER, screen capture, live wallpapers from any image, full media
com.haier.emanual960399full storage, location, camera, overlay, security alert, hack threat
it.hon.service23REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES, INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER, LOCATION_HARDWARE
com.haierubic.usmartdevice16mic, camera, location, SMS, contacts, cleartext to haier-cloud.com
com.haier.hkcfac11WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS, full storage, WiFi AP control
com.cvte.tv.at12same factory-control surface

com.haier.gamingbar is the standout. An OEM game overlay with READ_FRAMEBUFFER and screen-capture, live-wallpaper-from-image, full storage, and an overlay channel, no user present, is a ready-made RCE surface. com.haier.emanual9603, a manual, asks for 99 permissions including location, camera, and security alert plus hack threat receivers.

com.cltv.mal is a different category again. It is a device-admin (BATTERY_STATS, SECURITY_SETTINGS_DEV): force-lock, reset-password, monitor-unlock, always-on VPN, uninstall requests. It is not a feature a TV owner needs.

The factory junk

com.haier.hkcfac and com.cvte.tv.at are factory test apps. WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS, full storage, WiFi AP control. They are not needed in a living room, and they carry the same “trusted system” status that makes them attractive pivot points.

Removal

The working command per package, backed up first:

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adb shell pm path com.haier.gamingbar
adb pull /system_ext/app/GamingBar/GamingBar.apk ./backup/
adb shell pm uninstall --user 0 com.haier.gamingbar   # -> Success

Eight packages came out: tv.anoki.acr.anokiacroptin, com.haier.hkcfac, com.cvte.tv.at, com.haier.emanual9603, com.haier.gamingbar, com.cltv.mal, com.haierubic.usmartdevice, and it.hon.service. Two stayed on purpose: com.telink.lt handles the Bluetooth remote, and com.cvte.autobacklight drives the display backlight.

The trap that cost me a cycle: pm uninstall --user 0 on Anoki reported Success, then the package was back. The reason is that it was also installed for a second profile. pm list users showed Owner (user 0) and new_user (user 10). Bare pm list packages spans every user, so the package looked present even after the user-0 uninstall. The fix is to sweep each user:

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for u in 0 10; do
  adb shell pm uninstall --user $u tv.anoki.acr.anokiacroptin
done

After the second pass it was gone from both. Same sweep for the rest.

One piece does not come out without root: the native HAL [email protected] is an init-started service, separate from the app package. setprop ctl.stop is refused to the shell uid. It is inert once the app is gone, because the capture and exfil logic lived in the app process and the HAL alone has no client to serve, but killing the process itself needs root.

Result

Eight packages removed across both users, originals backed up to removed_backup/ so anything can be restored with adb install -r without a factory reset. Launcher, settings, ADB, the BT remote, and the backlight all verified alive after the sweep. No boot loop.

If you take one thing from this: a cheap Android TV is not cheap because the hardware is generous. The margin comes out somewhere, and on this box it came out as an automatic content recognition package that listens, fingerprints, and ships the result to an ad network. The package name literally says “opt-in.” It was on by default.

What is still open

  • The Anoki HAL survives app removal. Without root it cannot be stopped. The practical kill is removing the app, which is done, plus a DNS sinkhole on aistrm.net and acr-config.aistrm.net for belt and suspenders. DoH means the sinkhole has to be at the network, not the device.
  • com.at.factory.androidtvaidlservice is still installed. It is a factory AIDL service with a wide permission set, left alone because it may be an input and HDMI dependency. Worth a look if you want to go deeper.
  • Firmware updates can bring any of this back. A vendor OTA may re-provision removed system apps. Disabling OTA, or re-running the sweep after an update, is the only durable answer without root.
This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.